IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ESWATINI
Civil Appeal Case No: 56/2013
In the matter between:
NICHOLAS MANANA FIRST APPLICANT
JOSIAH YENDE SECOND APPLICANT
DAN MANGO THIRD APPLICANT
ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL FIRST RESPONDENT
SWAZILAND GOVERNMENT SECOND RESPONDENT
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THIRD RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: Nicholas Manana and Two Others vs Acting President of the Industrial Court and Others (56/2013)  SZHC 9 (2019)
Coram: JUSTICE M. C. B. MAPHALALA, CJ
JUSTICE S. P. DLAMINI, JA
JUSTICE M. J. DLAMINI, JA
JUSTICE J. P. ANNANDALE, JA
JUSTICE J. CURRIE, AJA
Heard : 07th March, 2019
Delivered : 30th April, 2019
Civil Procedure – review application in terms of section 148 (2) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of ESwatini – applicants employed by the Government on three year renewable contracts as nominated members of the Industrial Court in terms of Section 6 of the Industrial Relations Act No. 1 of 2000 as amended – their remuneration was in the form of retainer fees and sitting allowances – at the end of their final contracts, they were entitled to be paid gratuity in terms of Legal Notice No. 146 of 2010 calculated in accordance with retainer fees over the contract period – in an application for payment of the gratuity calculated on the basis of the retainer fees and sitting allowances, a compromise was concluded paying them gratuity based on the retainer fees and the balance of the claim was referred to trial – a Consent Order was made in this regard by the High Court – the High Court had also found in respect of the balance of the gratuity based on allowances that the issue of the gratuity was res judicata on the basis of the compromise concluded between the parties - the Supreme Court on appeal confirmed the decision of the High Court;
Applicants have lodged a review application in terms of section 148 (2) of the Constitution - the issue before this Court on review is whether both the retainer fees as well as the sitting allowances should be taken into account in computing the gratuity payable to the applicants;
Held that the Supreme Court on appeal committed a reviewable error of law by confirming the High Court judgment that the issue of the balance of the gratuity based on allowances was res judicata and subsequently compromised;
Held further that the gratuity due to the applicants should be calculated on the basis of both the retainer fees as well as the sitting allowances in view of the definitions of remuneration and wages reflected in the Industrial Relations Act as amended as well as the Employment Act respectively;
Accordingly, the application is granted with costs.
M. C. B. MAPHALALA, CJ:
 It is common cause that the applicants were employed by the Government of Eswatini as Nominated Members of the Industrial Court in accordance with Section 6 of the Industrial Relations Act. The Act further provides that the Industrial Court shall be constituted before a Judge and two Members, one Member nominated by the employees’ federations and the other Member nominated by the employers’ federation. Nominated Members are appointed by the Judge President from a panel of six names submitted by the federations for a term of three years which may be renewed. The terms and conditions of Nominated and Alternate Members are determined by the Minister of Labour; however, with the advent of the constitution which classifies the Industrial Court and Industrial Court of Appeal as specialised courts within the Judiciary, it is apparent that the Judiciary should determine the terms and conditions of Nominated and Alternate Members.
 The applicants were appointed as Nominated Members of the Industrial Court of ESwatini in between 1991 and 1997 respectively. Each of them was given a three year renewable contract; however, in their last contract, they were given a contract of two years for purposes of completing part-heard matters.
 The termination of their contracts followed upon the publication of Legal Notice No. 146 of 2010 which detailed terms and conditions of Nominated and Alternate Members. The applicants were not satisfied with their terms and conditions; hence, they engaged their employer for better terms and conditions. Pursuant thereto the employer informed them that their contracts would not be renewed upon termination. Subsequently, they instituted proceedings before the High Court challenging their employer for terminating their contracts of employment. They further sought an order claiming gratuity on a higher scale above the gratuity provided by Legal Notice No. 146 of 2010.
 It is common cause that a compromise was concluded between the parties before the application was heard in Court, and, that gratuity was subsequently paid to them calculated on the basis of their retainer fees. However, the Court referred the balance of the gratuity based on the sitting allowances to trial before the High Court. During the hearing of the matter, on the 11th September 2013, the application was dismissed with costs on the basis that the gratuity was compromised and subsequently res judicata.
 The applicants lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court on appeal on the 25th September, 2013; this was followed by an urgent application to hear the appeal on an urgent basis. This interlocutory application was subsequently dismissed by Justice Ota JA sitting as a single Judge of the Supreme Court. On appeal the Supreme Court upon hearing the appeal confirmed the decision of the High Court and dismissed the appeal.
 The applicant lodged a review application in terms of section 148 (2) of the Constitution. During the hearing of the review application, both Counsel agreed that the issue for determination by this Court was whether the computation of the gratuity should be based on both the retainer fees of
E8 612.00 (Eight Thousand Six Hundred and Twelve Emalangeni) per month as well as the sitting allowances. It was further agreed that the Members were paid sitting allowances calculated on the basis of their sittings. There was also a concession that if the members were sitting daily for twenty-two days per month, the sitting allowances would be E9 900.00 (Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Emalangeni) per month.
 The respondents had argued that the gratuity had been paid to the applicants on the basis of the compromise; hence, they could not pursue the claim for an increased gratuity. The High Court as well as the Supreme Court on appeal accepted the contention by the respondents that the parties had concluded a compromise effectively settling the matter; both Courts concluded that the issue of the gratuity was therefore compromised and res judicata. The Supreme Court on appeal proceeded to hold that the applicants, by pursuing the issue of the gratuity in light of the compromise, were in fact abandoning the Consent Order.
 The Consent Order was issued on the 17th February, 2012 by Justice Ota sitting as a Judge of the High Court after being delegated by the Chief Justice Ramodibedi. In terms of the Consent Order the Government was ordered to pay the sum of E201 643.27 (Two Hundred and One Thousand Six Hundred and Forty-three Emalangeni and Twenty-seven cents) in respect of part-payment of the applicants’ gratuity subject to the applicable tax. The Court further ordered that the difference of the amount of E201 643.27 (Two Hundred and One Thousand Six Hundred and Forty-three Emalangeni and Twenty seven cents) paid as gratuity and the original claim is referred to. Costs were ordered to be costs in the cause.
 I agree with the applicants that the Consent Order did not render the claim res judicata. On the contrary the Consent Order allowed the applicants to pursue the difference of the amount of gratuity paid and the original claim. It is not disputed that the applicants were seeking payment of gratuity based on the retainer fees as well as sitting allowances. It is apparent that the Supreme Court on appeal committed a reviewable error of law by concluding that the claim for gratuity had been rendered res judicata by the Consent Order.
 The terms and conditions of Nominated and Alternate Members of the Industrial Court were made by the Minister of Labour and Social Security in accordance with his powers conferred by Sections 6 and 108 of the Industrial Relations Act 2000 as amended. The relevant regulations for purposes of this judgment are as follows:
“2. (1) A nominated Member of the Industrial Court shall be entitled to an all inclusive monthly allowance of Eight Thousand Six Hundred and Twelve Emalangeni (E8 612.00) payable in accordance to Government practice.
(2) An Alternate Member of the Industrial Court shall be entitled to a Retainer Fee of Three Thousand Five Hundred and Twelve Emalangeni (E3 512.00) per month.
(3) A nominated or alternate member attending a Court sitting including any official business of the Court shall be paid a sitting fee prescribed for statutory boards from time to time.
3. Where an alternate member uses the member’s car to
travel between the member’s normal place of residence and the Industrial Court, the member shall be entitled to claim a mileage allowance for each trip as prescribed by the relevant Government Circulars.
4. Nominated members and alternate members shall be appointed for three (3) years with effect from the
1st September, 2010.
5. If an alternate member uses public transport when attending a Court sitting or other official Court business the member shall be eligible to claim commuted bus allowance as prescribed by the relevant Government Circulars from time to time.
6. A nominated member of the Industrial Court shall be entitled to a gratuity at the expiry of the member’s term of office. The gratuity shall be paid at the rate of 25% of the total monthly inclusive allowance
(E8 612) Eight Thousand Six Hundred and Twelve Emalangeni earned by a member after the completion of the term of three (3) years.”
 It is apparent from the Legal Notice that Nominated Members are remunerated at a monthly retainer fee of E8 612.00 (Eight Thousand Six Hundred and Twelve Emalangeni) as well as sitting allowance which include the daily sitting allowance of the Member as well as travelling allowance. Alternate Members are remunerated at a retainer fee of E3 512.00 (Three Thousand Five Hundred and Twelve Emalangeni) together with a sitting allowance calculated in the same manner as Nominated Members. The Members are appointed for a renewable period of three years. At the end of their term of office Members become entitled to receive gratuity calculated at the rate of 25% of the total monthly inclusive allowance of E8 612.00 (Eight Thousand Six Hundred and Twelve Emalangeni) earned by the Member.
 It is common cause that the gratuity paid to the applicants was calculated on the basis of the retainer fees paid to the applicants, and, the sitting allowances were excluded. It is the applicants’ contention that the calculation of the gratuity should also include the sitting allowances which were part of their remuneration. The Court was referred to section 2 of the Industrial Relations Act which defines remuneration as “wages or salary and any additional payments payable in cash or in kind directly or indirectly by the employer in connection with the employment of an employee”. This definition is inclusive of all monies received by the employee in the form of wages or salary and any additional payments made to the employee. In the instant matter the additional payments made to the employee include allowances.
 The applicants further referred this Court to the definition of wages in the Employment Act in support of their proposition that sitting allowances should be included in the calculation of gratuity at the end of the contract period as provided for in the Legal Notice issued by the Minister of Labour and Social Security. Wages are defined as “remuneration or earnings including allowances, however designated or calculated, capable of being expressed in terms of money and fixed by mutual agreement or by law which are payable by an employer to an employee for work done under a contract of employment or for services rendered or to be rendered under such contract”. This definition of wages also includes both allowances and retainer fees in the computation of gratuity due to the applicants.
 In view of the definitions of remuneration in the Industrial Relations Act and the Employment Act, the restriction and exclusion of sitting allowances in the calculation of gratuity is in breach of the two legislative provisions enacted by Parliament. The Employment Act further provides that “except as expressly provided by this Act, any arrangement by any person to contract out of its provisions shall be null and void”. The Employment Act also provides the following:
“27. No contract of employment shall provide for any employee any less favourable condition than is required by any law. Any condition in a contract of employment which does not conform with this Act or any other law shall be null and void and the contract shall be interpreted as if for that condition there were substituted the appropriate condition required by law”.
 The Employment Act provides that the provisions of the Act shall apply to employment with the Government excluding employment in the Police Service, the Umbutfo ESwatini Defence Force and ESwatini Correctional Services. However, the application of this legislative provision is subject to Section 6 which gives the Minister of Labour and Social Security powers to exempt any person or public authority from the operation of the Act or any regulation or rule made under the Act by order published in the Gazette; however, the Minister does not have the powers of exemption which would be incompatible with any International Labour Convention.
 The Industrial Relations Act has a similar provision giving the Minister of Labour and Social Security powers to exempt any person or public authority from the operation of a provision of the Act or any other regulation or rule made under the Act. The Act further provides that it shall apply to employment with the Government with the exception of Umbutfo ESwatini Defence Force, the Police Service as well as the Correctional Services.
 From a reading of the Employment Act as well as the Industrial Relations Act, it is apparent that the two legislative provisions apply equally to the applicants. Accordingly, both the retainer as well as the sitting allowances should be taken into account when calculating the gratuity due to the applicants on the basis of the definition of remuneration and wages as reflected in the Industrial Relations Act and Employment Act respectively. This is more compelling when considering that Legal Notice No. 146 of 2010 constitutes delegated legislation made by the Minister of Labour and Social Security under Sections 6 and 108 of the Industrial Relations Act. The powers of the Minister in terms of the enabling legislation is to make regulations, and, Legal Notice No. 146 of 2010 constitutes regulations on the terms and conditions of service for Nominated and Alternate Members of the Industrial Court.
 The delegated powers conferred upon the Minister of Labour and Social Security to determine the remuneration of Nominated and Alternate Members are too broad and lack specific guidelines. The wide administrative powers conferred upon the Minister lack appropriate guidelines on how the Minister should exercise his discretion. It is well-settled that a discretion which is unfettered and unguided has the propensity of violating human rights.
 It is common cause that the regulations in the Legal Notice prescribe the remuneration for Members in the form of retainer fees and sitting allowances. However, another regulation provides that at the expiry of the contract period of three years, gratuity due to the Members will be calculated on the basis of 25% of the total monthly inclusive allowance of E8 612.00 (Eight Thousand Six Hundred and Twelve Emalangeni) earned by the Member. Effectively this means that gratuity is calculated on the basis of the retainer, and, that sitting allowances are excluded. Such a regulation overlooks the definitions of remuneration and wages in the Industrial Relations Act and Employment Act which incorporate both the retainer fees as well as the sitting allowances.
 It is well-settled that the delegation of legislative power should not confer broad discretionary powers to an administrative official without guidelines for its exercise because this may interfere with individual rights. In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs, Parliament had given officials of the Department of Home Affairs wide powers to grant or extend residence permits, but had not provided any criteria to guide the exercise of the discretionary powers. Justice O’ Regan J delivering a majority judgment of the Constitutional Court had this to say:
“47. . . . . Moreover, if broad discretionary powers contain no express constraints, those who are affected by the exercise of the broad discretionary powers will not know what is relevant to the exercise of those powers or in what circumstances they are entitled to seek relief from an adverse decision. In the absence of any clear statement to that effect in the legislation, it would not be obvious to a potential applicant that the exercise of the discretion conferred upon the Immigration Officials and the Director General (DG) by ss 26(3) and (6) is constrained by the provisions of the Bill of Rights and, in particular, what factors are relevant to the decision to refuse to grant or extend a temporary permit. If rights are to be infringed without redress, the very purposes of the Constitution are defeated.
48. . . . . The fact, however, that the exercise of a discretionary power may subsequently be successfully challenged on administrative grounds, for example, that it was not reasonable, does not relieve the Legislature of its constitutional obligation to promote, protect and fulfil the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. In a constitutional democracy such as ours the responsibility to protect constitutional rights in practice is imposed both on the Legislature and on the Executive and its officials. The legislature must take care when legislation is drafted to limit the risk of an unconstitutional exercise of the discretionary powers it confers”.
 The Constitution protects the rights of workers. Section 32 of the Constitution provides the following:-
“32. (1) A person has the right to practise a profession and to carry on any lawful occupation, trade or business.
(2) A worker has a right to –
(a) freely form, join or not join a trade union for the promotion and protection of the economic interests of that worker; and
(b) collective bargaining and representation
(3) The employer of a female worker shall accord that worker protection before and after child birth in accordance with law.
(4) Parliament shall enact laws to –
(a) Provide for the right of persons to work under satisfactory, safe and healthy conditions;
(b) Ensure equal payment for equal work without discrimination;
(c) Ensure that every worker is accorded rest and reasonable working hours and periods of holidays with pay as well as remuneration for public holidays; and
(d) Protect employees from victimisation and unfair dismissal or treatment”.
 The Regulations in Legal Notice No. 146 of 2010 deprive the applicants of their right to have their gratuity calculated on both the retainer fees as well as sitting allowances in accordance with the definitions of remuneration and wages as reflected in the Industrial Relations Act and the Employment Act respectively. It is not disputed that the Industrial Relations Act provides for remuneration of Nominated and Alternate Members in the form of retainer fees as well as sitting allowances; however, there is no logical explanation why the rights of the applicants should not be protected by including both retainer fees as well as allowances in calculating their gratuity.
 The High Court as well as the Supreme Court on appeal held that the gratuity claimed by the applicants was compromised in view of the Consent Order issued by Justice Ota on the 17th February, 2012, and, that it was consequently res judicata. However, it is worth mentioning that the Attorney for the respondents did not address the issue from the bar or include it in his heads of argument. On the contrary the applicants’ Attorney dealt with the issue extensively in his heads of argument and further addressed the issue before this Court.
 Justice Ota issued three orders: Firstly, directing the second respondent to pay the applicants the sum of E201 643.27 (Two Hundred and One Thousand Six Hundred and Forty-Three Emalangeni and Twenty-seven cents) subject to the applicable tax, being part-payment of applicants’ gratuity. Secondly, the difference of the sum of E201 643.27 (Two Hundred and One Thousand Six Hundred and Forty-Three Emalangeni and Twenty-seven cents), and, the original claim be and is hereby referred to the Registrar for allocation of a trial date. Thirdly, costs to be costs in the cause.
 The Supreme Court on appeal committed a reviewable error of law when it confirmed the High Court judgment that the issue of the gratuity was compromised and consequently res judicata. It is apparent from the judgment of Justice Ota delivered on the 17th February, 2012 that the payment of E201 643.27 (Two Hundred and One Thousand Six Hundred and Forty-Three Emalangeni and Twenty-seven cents) was part-payment of applicants’ gratuity. Furthermore, the difference of the amount ordered to be paid and the original claim which comprised both the retainer fees and the sitting allowances was referred to trial. Accordingly, the applicants’ claim was not compromised and certainly not res judicata.
 Van Der Merwe and his Co-Authors define a compromise as an agreement whereby a dispute which may or may not involve litigation characterised by uncertainty as to the existence or terms of a legal relationship, is settled by the parties, who agree to regulate their relationship in a particular way, often by creating a new set of obligations between them. The Learned Authors contend that the purpose of a compromise is to terminate uncertainty and to avoid the inconvenience, costs and risk inherent in resorting to other methods of resolving disputes. They further contend that a compromise is not a species of motivation, and, that it excludes any possibility of an animus novandi. However, a compromise like all other agreements may be vitiated by a material mistake, duress, misreprentation or undue influence at the instance of the aggrieved party.
 De Villiers JA in City of Cape Town v Claremont Union College had this to say with regard to a compromise:
“I take it to be an elementary general proposition of law that when any dispute or question of liability arises between two persons, they are competent to settle the matter between themselves by agreement, without being compelled to have recourse to a court of law. It is interesting to find that Voet lays down (omm.2.15.2), that “agreements concerning doubtful things (i.e. compromises) may be entered by all persons who are not prohibited.”
 Miller JA in Gollach & Gomperts v Universal Mills & Produce Company delivering a unanimous judgment on transactio or compromise had this to say:
“In Cachalia v Harberer & Company, 1905 T.S 475 at page 462, Solomon J accepted the definition of transactio given by Grotius, Introduction, 3.4.2, as an agreement between litigants for the settlement of a matter in dispute.
Voet, 2.15.1, gives a somewhat wider definition which includes settlement of matters in dispute between parties who are not litigants and later at , 2.15.10., he includes within the scope of transactio agreements on doubtful matters arising from the uncertainty of pending conditions even though no suit is then in being or apprehended’ . . . The purpose of a transactio is not only to put an end to existing litigation but also to prevent or avoid litigation. This is very clearly stated by Domat, Civil Law, Vol. 1, para. 1078, in a passage quoted in Estate Erasmus v. Church, 1927 T. P. D. 20 at page 24 but which bears repetition:
A transaction is an agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or ending a law suit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, in the matter which they agree on; and which every one of them prefers to the hopes of gaining, joining with the danger of losing.
. . . .
A transactio whether extra-judicial or embodied in an order of Court, has the effect of res judicata . . . . It is obvious that, like any other contract (and like any order of Court), a transactio may be set aside on the ground that it was fraudulently obtained. There is authority to the effect that it may also be set aside on the ground of mistake, where the error is justus.”
 Plewman JA in Hlobo v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund delivering a majority judgment of the Supreme Court of South Africa had this to say:
“10. . . . . A compromise (or transactio) arrived at between litigants is a well-established measure. Our Courts encourage parties to deal with their disputes in this way and the rules decree that compromises must be sought. When concluded such a compromise disposes of the proceedings. . . . What is more, in this country (as in England) the conduct of a party’s case at the trial of an action is in the entire control of the party’s counsel. Counsel has the authority to compromise on any matter in it unless he has received instructions to the contrary. In England his apparent authority to compromise cannot be limited by instructions unknown to the other party. . . .
Counsel’s general authority in South Africa is similar.”
 The applicants seek an order reviewing and setting aside the decision of the Supreme Court on appeal which was handed down on the 29th July, 2015. They also seek an order for payment of their gratuity based on their sitting allowances during the period of their contracts. It is not disputed that gratuity based on their retainer fees was paid. The review application is based on Section 148(2) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of ESwatini which provides the following:
“148. (2) The Supreme Court may review any decision made or given by it on such grounds and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament or rule of Court.”
 The leading case in this country on the powers of the Supreme Court to review its own decisions emanating from its appellate jurisdiction in terms of Section 148(2) of the Constitution is President Street Properties (Pty) Ltd v. Maxwell Uchechukwu and Four Others. Justice Majahenkhaba Dlamini delivering a unanimous judgment of the full bench of the Supreme Court had this to say:
“26. In its appellate jurisdiction the role of this Supreme Court is to prevent injustice arising from the normal operation of the adjudicative system, and in its newly endowed review jurisdiction this Court has the purpose of preventing or ameliorating injustice arising from the operation of the rules regulating finality in litigation whether or not attributable to its own adjudication as the Supreme Court. Either way, the ultimate purpose and role of this Court is to avoid in practical situations gross injustice to litigants in exceptional circumstances beyond ordinary adjudicative contemplation. This exceptional jurisdiction must, when properly employed, be conducive to and productive of a higher sense and degree or quality of justice. Thus, faced with a situation of manifest injustice, irremediable by normal court processes, this Court cannot sit back or rest on its laurels and disclaim all responsibility on the argument that it is functus officio or that the matter is res judicata or that finality in litigation stops it from further intervention. Surely, the quest for superior justice among fallible beings is a never ending pursuit for our courts of justice, in particular, the apex court with the advantage of being the court of the last resort.
27. It is true that a litigant should not ordinarily have a ‘second bite at the cherry’, in the sense of another opportunity of appeal or hearing at the court of last resort. The review jurisdiction must therefore be narrowly defined and be employed with due sensitivity if it is not to open a flood gate of reappraisal of cases otherwise res judicata. As such this review power is to be invoked in a rare and compelling or exceptional circumstances . . . .
It is not review in the ordinary sense.”
 There was manifest injustice in the manner in which the Supreme Court on appeal dealt with the matter for the following reasons: Firstly, the gratuity should have been calculated on the basis of the retainer fees as well as the sitting allowances in light of the definitions of remuneration and wages as reflected in the Industrial Relations Act and Employment Act respectively. Secondly, the Court committed a reviewable error of law when it made a finding that the issue of the gratuity was compromised and consequently res judicata much against the weight of the evidence. Thirdly, the Court decided the case on the basis that the applicants were seeking gratuity accorded to permanent and pensionable employees whereas it was based on their contracts. This finding is not supported by the evidence. The applicants acknowledged that they were engaged on three year renewable contracts, and, that according to their contracts, they were entitled to receive gratuity at the expiry of each contract. Furthermore, their remuneration consisted of retainer fees and sitting allowances, both of which determined their gratuity at the end of each contract.
 Accordingly, the following order is made:
(a) The judgment of the Supreme Court on appeal is hereby reviewed and set aside in accordance with Section 148(2) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of ESwatini.
(b) The second respondent is ordered and directed to calculate and pay to the applicants the balance of their gratuity based on their sitting allowances during the currency of their contracts.
(c) The second respondent is directed to pay costs of suit on the ordinary scale.
For Applicants : Attorney Mduduzi Hlophe
For Respondents : Senior Crown Counsel Vusi Kunene
JUSTICE M. C. B. MAPHALALA
I agree _______________________
JUSTICE S. P. DLAMINI, JA
I agree ______________________
JUSTICE J. P. ANNANDALE, JA
I agree ______________________
JUSTICE J. CURRIE, AJA
 No. 1 of 2000 as amended
 Section 6 (6) of the Act
 Section 6 (4) of the Act
 Section 6 (8) of the Act
 Section 6 (8) of the Act
 Section 139 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of ESwatini Act No. 001
 Para 31 and 32 of the judgment
 Para 24, 25 and 26 of the judgment
 Pages 112 and 113 of the record of proceedings
 Regulations 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
 Legal Notice No. 146 of 2010
 No. 1 of 2000 as amended
 Act No. 5 of 1980 Section 2
 No. 146 of 2010
 Section 2 of Act No. 1 of 2000 as amended
 Section 2 of Act No. 5 of 1980
 Section 3 of the Employment Act No. 5 of 1980
 Section 27 of the Employment Act No. 5 of 1980
 Section 5 of the Employment Act
 Section 6 of the Employment Act
 Section 5 of Act 1 of 2000 as amended
 Section 3 of the Industrial Relations Act
 Regulation 2
 Legal Notice 106 of 2010
 Regulation 6
 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC)
 At para 47 and 48
 Court a quo in Nicholas Manana & Two Others v. Acting President of the Industrial Court & Two Others Hugh Court Case No. 1979/2011
 Van Der Merwe et al contract: General Principles; Fourth Edition, Juta & Company Limited, 2012, page 462
 1934 ad 414 AT 452
 1978 (1) SA 914 AD at 921 - 922
 2001 (2) SA 59 SCA 59 at Page 65, para 10
 Appeal Civil Case No. 11/2014
 At para 26 and 27