IN THE HIGH COURT OF ESWATINI
In the matter between: Case No. 1276/2017
SISTER CONCETTA GININDZA Applicant
SISTER STEPHANIA NGWENYA
(IN HER CAPACITY AS PRIORESS GENERAL
FOR THE SERVANTS OF MARY) 1st Respondent
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF SWAZILAND 2nd Respondent
Neutral citation : Sister Concetta Ginindza v Sister Stephania Ngwenya and Another (1276/2017)  SZHC 225 (29th November, 2019)
Coram : M. Dlamini J
Heard : 16th August, 2019
Delivered : 29th November, 2019
Summary: The parties in the present motion proceedings are all of ecclesiastes. The applicant is challenging respondents’ decision dismissing her from the congregation of sisters. The respondents argue that the applicant is barking at the wrong tree. The impugned decision was taken by the Holy Sea.
 The applicant is an elderly female, aged in 2017, seventy four years. Her parental homestead is at Mahlabane, district of Manzini. She joined the congregation of sisters under the Servants of Mary in 1964 under the Roman Catholic Faith. The 1st respondent is also an elderly female. She holds the reigns of Prioress General (Mother General) having succeeded applicant.
 The applicant has deposed that having joined the Servant of Mary (sisterhood) at the age of fourteen years old, she served as a nurse in all the 2nd respondent’s clinics. At the same time she rose in the ranks to occupy the highest position of Mother General. She then asserted that in the year 2007, when she was still Mother General;
“ [I] caused to be incorporated a company styled ST. JULIANAH’S CONVENT (PTY) LTD being a company registered under the laws of Swaziland trading as St. Juliana Conference and Accommodation. The directors of the aforementioned company were myself and one Sister Mary Maqwele.”
 She further stated under oath:
“11. The business of the Company, St. Julianah’s Convent (Pty) Ltd, primarily consisted of rendering conferencing and accommodation services to the public. The income generated from business of the company was then used for the welfare of the sisters within the Convent.”
 She deposed further that in 2011, 1st respondent was elected as Mother General. As soon as she occupied this position, 1st respondent demanded applicant’s resignation as director of the company. This demand intensified in 2015. The matter found its way to the Magistrate Court of Manzini under case No. 3563/17 where 1st respondent was seeking for her eviction following her dismissal from the sisterhood. Applicant then referred the court to the impugned decision by the 1st respondent and the Honourable Bishop Jose Luis Pouce de Leon dated 20th May 2017. She highlighted that the letter stated the reasons for the dismissal as follows:
“[I] have persisted in contumacious disobedience against lawful requests of [my] superior to remove [myself] completely from all matters relating to the administration of the congregation’s apostolic works,”
 The causa for the orders for review and setting aside the said decision of dismissal is pointed out by applicant as:
“17.1 The said decision violates the rules of natural justice in so far I was never given any hearing prior to my dismissal.
17.2 The alleged disobedience and decision to dismiss me is predicated upon unlawful instructions, being a call by the 1st respondent that I should surrender my powers of being a company director contrary to the Articles of association of the company on the removal of a Director thereof.
17.3 The dismissal from the church pertains to issues beyond the powers of the 1st Respondent and 2nd Respondent. The company, St. Julianah’s Convent (Pty) Ltd, is a distinct persona from the Roman Catholic Church with its own rights and obligations separate from those of the Roman Catholic Church.
17.4 The dismissal from the communion of sisters and the excommunication from the Roman Catholic Church violates my right to freedom of religion in so far as I am denied the right to be a member of the Roman Catholic Church (which neither 1st nor 2nd Respondents own) yet still denied the right to pursue the matter on appeal in any other forum.
17.5 The dismissal from the communion of sisters violates my right to dignity in so far as I have been given a paltry E5000.00 (Five Thousand Emalangeni) to start a new life elsewhere, contrary to settled practice and custom regarding the compensation of relocating members.”
The Respondents’ Averments
 The respondent commenced their case by highlighting the structural facet of the sisterhood. 1st respondent described the sisterhood as following:
“5. It is an evangelical and apostolic community of woman gathered under the guidance of the Holy Spirit under the faith of the Roman Catholic Church in Swaziland Diocese of Manzini who dedicate their lives to helping the people of God in our different communities. The Servite Sisters are under the direct control and supervision of the second respondent, which is in turn headed and administered by The Congregation for the Evangelisation of Peoples, based in Rome, Italy.”
 1st respondent also pointed out that as Mother General, she exercises “full authority and administrative powers over the entire”  sisterhood. She expatiated on the procedures undertaken before one becomes a member of the sisterhood. She deposed:
“The consecration of a Nun is a process which is preceded by a sufficiently long period of teachings and prayer wherein the willing aspirant is taught the beliefs, culture and practices of the congregation until she fully understands the same. Most importantly, upon consecration as a religious, a Nun undertakes to abide by three major vows of Chastity, Poverty and Obedience. Through the chastity vow, a Nun makes to commitment to celibacy throughout her religious life. The vow of Poverty speaks to the Nun committing to share all her income and possession with the community of God’s People and the congregation. She does not derive any personal financial benefit during her consecrated life. As a result if this vow, a Nun is precluded from engaging or establishing her own business enterprise. Under the vow of obedience a nun undertakes to accept and obey all decisions of her superiors without a challenge.”
 1st respondent proceeded to highlight that any failure to abide by the three vows attracts an ultimate sanction of dismissal from the sisterhood. 1st respondent pointed out that applicant was admitted to the sisterhood in 1975 after having undergone the above process. Applicant further served as Mother General from 1998 to 2007. In 2007, applicant caused to be established a company in the name of St. Julian Convent (Pty) Ltd trading as St. Juliana’s Conference and Accommodation. Applicant did so without seeking prior approval or consent of the General Council, a body overseeing the sisterhood. She then deposed:
“Upon discovery of the unauthorised registration of the company and out of Christianity values, the respondents decided not to legally challenge the registration of the same. This was on the basis and understanding that the company was being operated for the benefit of the entire Sisterhood family. Noteworthy is the fact that the applicant at paragraph 11 of her founding affidavit acknowledges and confirms that the income generated from the business of the company was used for the welfare of the sisters within the Convent.”
 What followed were a litany of maladministration actions at the instance of applicant. These were highlighted by respondents as mainly that in 2005 it was discovered that applicant ran the company and mero motu maintained a bank account. She then made large sum of cash withdrawals. This was despite that the company utilised premises and facilities belonging to the 2nd respondent. In the process, applicant failed to pay staff salaries, remit tax dues to eSwatini Revenue Authority, make monthly contribution for employees to the eSwatini National Provident Fund, pay rates to Manzini Municipality. Her conduct was confounded by her failure to keep financial books. She further failed to pay 2nd respondent any levy for utilising its premises and facility. Worse still she failed to pay suppliers as well. The total sum due to various creditors escalated to E6, 000, 000. Some of the creditors have already filed law suits against the company and 2nd respondent. 1st respondent then deposed:
“22. As a result of the aforesaid and in the exercise of my powers as a Prioress General and after consulting the applicant, I caused to be issued a correspondence to applicant dated 25th May 2015 ordering the applicant to do a hand-over of the company’s affairs (project house) and to withdraw from its administration altogether.”
 There was no response to the correspondence of 25th May, 2015. 1st respondent authored a follow up letter dated 14th August 2015. Applicant responded by correspondence dated 14th September, 2015. Following applicant’s failure to comply with her undertaking communicated to 1st respondent on 14th September 2015, 1st respondent caused a meeting between applicant, his Excellency the Bishop and herself. The results were:
“25. at that meeting the applicant out of her own volition agreed as follows:
25.1 That she be transferred back to St. Juliana’s convent on 31st March 2016.
25.2 That she would do the handover of the company’s affairs on the 1st March 2016.”
 However, applicant persisted with her defiance. His Excellency wrote to the applicant on 1st March 2016 pleading with her to comply as per her undertaking in the meeting of 14th September 2015. Upon receipt of His Excellency’s plea, applicant instead:
“28. Instead, the applicant lodged an appeal against the order for the handing over of the administration of the company/project house to The Apostolic Nunciature, which is a regional administrative body of the second respondent, above the office of The Bishop, which sits in Pretoria in the Republic of South Africa.”
 Is applicant entitled to the order sought i.e. reviewing and setting aside respondents decision of 20th May, 2017? Applicants’ second prayer presents no issue as during the hearing it was conceded on her behalf that she was not ex-communicated from communion and the church. The second prayer was accordingly withdrawn by her Counsel.
 The applicant deposed of the 1st and 2nd respondents:
“2. The First Respondent is Reverend Sister Stephania Ngwenya cited herein her capacity as the Prioress General (Mother General) of the Servants of Mary, a congregation of sisters under the Roman Catholic Church of Swaziland. She is based at the Sisters’ Family home at Mahlabane (Mzimpofu) area in the Manzini District.
3. The Second Respondent is the Roman Catholic Church of Swaziland, a universitas with capacity to sue and be sued under the laws of Swaziland with its principal place of business at Manzini in the Manzini district.”
 She also attested about herself:
“5. During the year of 1964 at the age of fourteen years, I joined the Servite Sisters of Mary, a family of nuns under the Roman Catholic Church. At that time the 2nd respondent was under the command of the then Bishop Barneski.”
 The respondents confirmed this description of the parties by applicant. In brief, the parties herein are members of the ecclesiastical class. This means that they enjoy a spiritual relationship among themselves. It follows therefore that their interaction on the day-to-day affairs is regulated by precepts different from what would guide ordinary individuals. Van der Westhuizen J faced with similar parties of standing, introduced the subject as follows:
“And they have the last word. What they decides, even with a narrow…majority, no person can change. It can declare elections….invalid…it can ban political parties …[Its judgement] reach out into the last office, into the last house”. [Richter Machen Politik (Fischer Taschen buchverl, Frankfurt 1979) at 11-2]
 The learned Justice was quick to point out that the above criticism was directed to the German Federal Constitutional Court. He then embarked on a lengthy discussion of how far secular laws were, particularly the constitution, could regulate the affairs of individuals and society. He enquired in this regard:
“How far do the Constitution and its interpretation and enforcement-by courts reach into our private and social lives? Is there, somewhere in our churches, temples, mosque and synagogues – or for that matter kitchens and bedrooms – a constitution – free” zone? 
 The learned Justice of Constitutional Court of South Africa referred to Sachs J:
“The underlying problem in any open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom in which conscientious and religious freedom has to be regarded with appropriate seriousness, is how far such democracy can and must go in allowing members of religious communities to define for themselves which laws they will obey and which not. Such a society can cohere only if all its participants accept that certain basic norms and standards are binding. Accordingly, believers cannot claim automatic right to be exempted by their beliefs from the laws of the land. At the same time, the State should, wherever reasonably, possibly, seek to avoid putting, believers to extremely painful and intensely burdensome choices of either being true to their faith or else respectful of the law.”
 The learned Judge having pointed out that rights and values do often compete among themselves and against such other, then espoused:
“Is it contradictory to say that the Constitution does have a role to play in every sphere, but that we do not want a court to intrude into private spaces with the bluntness of its orders? After all, the Constitution is law; we mostly want law to be enforceable; enforcement is important for the rule of law, because unenforceable law can hardly “rule”. The Constitution is more than law, however. It is the legal and moral framework within which we have agreed to live. It also not only leaves, but guarantees space to exercise our diverse cultures and religions and express freely our like, dislikes and choices, as equals with human dignity. In this sense one could perhaps talk about a “Constitutionally permitted free space. This is quite different from contending that certain areas in a constitutional democracy are beyond the reach of the Constitution, or ‘constitution-free’. ”
 Van der Westhuizen J then held that the doctrine of entanglement was correctly upheld by the court a quo and agreed with the unanimous judgement by Moseneke DCJ.
Doctrine of entanglement
 This doctrine was well articulated by their Leaderships in the Supreme Court as follow:
“In the open and democratic society contemplated by the Constitution there must be mutually respectful co-existence between the secular and the sacred. The function of the court is to recognise the sphere which each inhabits, not to force the one into the sphere of the other.”
 The court referred to Farlam J  to the effect that the doctrine was then part of South African law: The court then explained about the doctrine:
“This doctrine entails a reluctance of the courts to become involved in doctrinal disputes of a religious character (Taylor v Kurstag par 39) . the reason underlying the rule has been expressed by Woolman and Zeffert as follows:
‘[I]n a radically heterogeneous society governed by a Constitution committed to pluralism and private ordering, a polity in which both the state and members of a variety of religious communities must constantly negotiate between the sacred and the profane, courts ought to avoid enmeshment in internecine quarrels within communities regarding the content or the truth of particular beliefs.’”
 In the United States, their Lordships expatiated, this doctrine has found its way into the Amendment. With reference to United States v Ballard, they quoted as follows:
“The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect… The First Amendment has a dual aspect. It not only ‘forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship’ but also ‘safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.
As a result, American courts will not entertain religious disputes at all. Decisions of religious tribunals are subject only to such appeals as the religious body itself allows. In Presbyterian Church v Hull Church  USSC 24; 393 US 440 (1969) it was stated:
‘But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them [sic] reversed. It is of the essence of these religious union, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.’
 Again with reference to Serbian Orthodox Diocess v Milivojevich,  the court pointed on the court’s power to review decisions of the church body:
“For civil courts to analyse whether the ecclesiastical action of a church judicatory are in that sense ‘arbitrary’ must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that cannon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else into the substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question. But this is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits, recognition of such an exception would undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them.”
 The court then turned to the English jurisprudence and highlighted:
“ ‘I think that the reason is to be found in this. There has always been in England more than one system of law. I will not say that the cannon and civil law is as old as the common law, but it is, at any rate, of ntiquity approaching the common law, and was very vigorous and had great effect in the days of the Plantagenets. The common law existed side by side with the civil law, and there were the two sets of courts, the cours spiritual and the common law courts.’
Thus in R v Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregation of Great Britain and the Commonwealth ex parte Watchmannthe court held:
‘That consideration apart, the court is hardly in a position to regulate what is essentially a religious function – the determination whether someone is morally and religiously fit to carry out the spiritual duties of his office. The court must inevitably be wary of entering so self-evidently sensitive an area, straying across the well recognised divide between church and state.
One cannot, therefore, escape the conclusion that, if judicial review lies here then one way or another this secular court must inevitably be drawn into adjudicating upon matter intimate to a religious community.’”
 It was pointed out that a line of demarcation was drawn by the court in England.
“ ‘This distinction between a religious belief or practice and its civil consequences underlies the way that the English and Scottish courts have always, until recently, approached issues out of disputes within a religious community or with a religious basis. In both jurisdictions the courts do not adjudicate on the truth or religious beliefs or on the validity of particular rites. But where a claimant asks the court to enforce private rights and obligations which depend on religious issues, the judge may have to determine such religious issues as are capable of objective ascertainment. The court addresses questions of religious belief and practices where its jurisdiction is invoked either to enforce the contractual rights of members of a community against other members or governing body or to ensure that property held on trust is used for the purpose of the trust,’ “
 At the end the court in De Lange held on the merits:
“it is also inappropriate for this court to require the Church to recognise same-sex unions as religiously ordained-particularly when the church is itself involved in a complex and lengthy process to determine that doctrinal issue itself. To do so would be to prescribe religious tenants to the members and ministers of the Church in violation of the right to freedom of religion and religious association. Indeed, the doctrine of entanglement militates strongly against the court becoming involved in religions doctrinal disputes.”
 Having referred to the above, I see no reason why I should not import this doctrine to the present case. After all just like in South Africa, our Constitution reigns supreme. I say this bearing in mind that the only instance where our courts could intervene is as per the Australian position as propounded by Stirling J:
“[F]irst, whether the rules of the club have been observed; secondly, whether anything has been done contrary to natural justice, and thirdly, whether the decision complained of has been come to bona fide.”
Case in casu
 When the matter was mentioned on the roll, I highlighted the doctrine of entanglement to both Counsel. I suggested that the parties go back to the drawing board and settle their dispute amicably in terms of their faith and convictions. To my dismay the matter resurfaced. The parties had failed to reach common ground. Judging from its long protracted history, negotiations were bound to fail however.
 The applicant lamented as a decision taken by 1st and 2nd respondents dismissing her from the sisterhood. I must however put into perspective the events as they unfolded, evident by the voluminous exchange of correspondences in this matter.
 It is not disputed that applicant rose to the ranks of Mother General in 1998 until 2007. On her last year, she together with Sister Maqwele registered a company. It is common cause that Sister Maqwele resigned from the sisterhood and returned to the secular world. It does not appear however that she resigned as director and shareholder of the company. What is certain though from the pleadings serving before court is that the company has no properties. On its inception it took over the business of 2nd respondent. This business had been operating for many decades under the supervision of Mother General by virtue of her office. The business had been up and running for decades before applicant registered the company which utilised the premises and the facilities of the 2nd respondent as its own.
 Applicant has failed to answer to the respondent’s allegation that she formed the company to take over 2nd respondent’s business without obtaining consultation and authority from any of the respondent’s. In her reply, she referred this court to affidavits filed by 1st respondent and Sister Maqwele as evidence of consent to the formation of the company. This is totally misleading. Neither 1st respondent nor Sister Maqwele deposed to the effect that they consented to the formation of the company. Their affidavits were defending a claim against the company occasioned by applicant while she was no longer Mother General. In as much as the affidavits filed at the Industrial Court showed that 1st respondent and Sister Maqwele accepted the existence of the company, they were not evidence of consent to its initial formation.
 Ponnan JA  pointed out that in a religious set up there must be acceptance that even though certain activities or conduct is contrary to the precepts of the church, the church may tolerate such conduct. Tolerance should therefore not be taken as an unequivocal embracement or acceptance in the legal sense of the word. Similarly in casu, the respondents upon discovery of the existence of the company tolerated it. The averment in reply therefore by applicant that deponent [1st respondent] “is one person who can tell lies under oath, a whole Reverend for that matter” are certainly uncalled for as they are unjustified and cold. They further do not depict applicant’s calling and office as a follower of Christ, let alone a nun, if at all.
 The applicant’s bone of contention is that the respondents have no right in terms of the company laws of this country to compel her to resign from the company. The reason being that there is no resolution of the company’s directors authorising her to relinquish her shares and directorship. Again this averments calls for me to put the events into perspective. Applicant has not disputed that she occupied the office of Mother General not by contract but as a hierarchy of the sisterhood. This office is for a specific term. When her term ended in 2007, she was expected to make a hand over to the incoming Mother General. This handover was for the long existing business commenced by the sisterhood.
 In her founding affidavit she deposed:
“The call for my resignation as director intensified during the year 2015 as the 1st respondent sent numerous correspondence to me to that effect.”
 She then attaches annexure CG2 as evidence of the above. I must point out that I have read annexure CG2. Nowhere does the 1st respondent asserts that the applicant should resign as director of the company. On the contrary the 1st respondent deposed that applicant was refusing to “relinquish her position as director of St. Juliana’s Conference and Accommodation. At paragraph 20 she again states that applicant” refused and neglected to relinquish her directorship powers of over the Holy Family Convent in Manzini (St. Juliana’s Conference and Accommodation).
 The company is not mentioned in the entire affidavit served before the Magistrate Court as annexure CG2. The affidavit (CG2) is evidence of 1st respondent previous numerous correspondences to applicant calling upon her to make a handover as she had been in charge of the business of St. Juliana’s Conference and Accommodation. This name and the business existed even before applicant became Mother General and her subsequent formation of the company. The company’s name is St. Juliana’s Convent (Pty) Ltd. Nowhere does this name feature in any of the affidavit and correspondence. It is not in issue that since the 1st respondent was elected into the office of Mother General, applicant has failed to make a handover.
 This is despite that the dictates of the office of mother General calls upon the incumbent to hold fort and be at the apex of St. Juliana’s Conference and Accommodation. Applicant wants to remain in this office under the guise that she is a shareholder and director of the company. This is despite that the company has no business of its own.
Audi alteram partem
 The applicant prays that this court reviews and set aside the decision of respondents communicated to her by correspondence dated 20th May 2017. As correctly agued by learned Counsel on behalf of respondents, firstly, the applicant has attached a number of correspondences between her and 1st respondent. She further points out that there was also a meeting held between 1st respondent, the Honourable Bishop and herself. This meeting was on the same issue of handing over or complying with 1st respondent’s instruction to hand over the business of the sisterhood.
 The respondents have attested to various exchange of correspondences and meetings on applicant’s call for a handover. Applicant herself has deposed that since 2011 when 1st respondent was elected as Mother General, she has been calling for her resignation. She deposed further that this intensified in 2015. The question is, what right of hearing does she want this court to order in light of all the exchange of correspondence and the meetings held?
 What confounds her application further is that she subsequently appealed. Her appeal was dismissed and she was ordered to comply with the instruction of 1st respondent. She then appealed to the Holy Sea. Again her appeal was dismissed. Now what right of hearing does she expect the court to grant her as she exercised it throughout the internal structures of the Church.
 The second misnomer at the instance of applicant is that she seeks this court to review and set aside the “decision of respondents dated 20th May 2017”. The undisputed evidence is that upon her appeal to the Holy Sea in Rome, Italy, the Holy Sea in dismissing her appeal authored:
“Having said the above, I would also like to communicate to you that at this point you do not have any right to make any legitimate and valid recourse against the decision of our Superior General because all the peremptory time limits have already expired long ago. Therefore, your continuation in the present office is fully illicit and you have no canonical authority to continue there or to do anything concerning the administration of the “Project House Conference Centre”; all your acts are completely illicit after August 25th 2015, the final date set by your Superior General for your handing over of the administration of the Centre, Moreover, from that date onwards your position is of “obstinate disobedience” to the legitimate superiors and “unlawful absence from the community” (ca, 696,91), both of which are sufficient reasons for your dismissal from the religious Institute.
“Hereby I also order you to obey immediately and unconditionally the above-mentioned decision, duly communicated to you by your Superior General, within 30 days of receiving this letter. If you do not obey this order you shall be dismissed from your religious Institute without any further warning because you already have had enough time to think and rethink on your position and accept the decision of the Superior, who has been extremely patient with you.”
 From the above, upon the Holy Sea considering her appeal he came to the decision that applicant’s persistent refusal to comply with 1st respondent orders ought to attract a penalty of dismissal. However, applicant was given a thirty (30) days grace period to comply failing which a dismissal. She was further advised that this was a final decision and no further indulgences would be afforded to her. In other words when 1st and 2nd respondent authored the correspondences of 20th May 2017, they were merely reminding applicant of what the Holy Sea had decided. In brief even if this court may set aside the correspondence of 20th May 2017, the dismissal sanction by the Holy Sea still stands. In the result, applicant’s prayers would have no force and effect on their grant by reason that they have been rendered abstract.
 The wise observations by Counsel Gerhand van der Schyff are apposite in casu:
“The right to admit members and clergy would also imply the right to discipline such people in order to enforce conformity and encourage conduct in harmony with religious precepts and teaching.”
 Further, following the ratio decidendi in De Lange on the acceptance of the doctrine of entanglement, I do not wish to be drawn to the argument that the applicant has spent almost her entire life in the sisterhood congregation and that the mere E5000 offered to her to commence life elsewhere is unreasonable. These matters are best dealt by the religious tribunals themselves. After all, applicant conceded that she took the vow to poverty. It is not clear why she had to insist on a higher figure and further why she decided to venture into the secular world by acquiring shares in a company. It is needless of me to make an inquiry on these questions. They are best suited to those who are fully vests with canonical laws. However, what is clear is that applicant cannot enjoy of both worlds. It is certain though that her dismissal from the sisterhood congregation would provide her with the opportunity to enjoy her directorship and shares in the company she has so dearly clung on over the years.
 In the result, I enter the following orders:
45.1 The applicant’s application is dismissed;
45.2 Costs to follow the event.
M. DLAMINI J
For Applicant : T. Mavuso of Motsa Mavuso Attorneys
For Respondent(s) : L. Manyatsi of Manyatsi & Associates
 See page 7 para 9 of book of pleadings (book)
 See page 9 para 16
 See pages 10-11 paras 17.1-17.5 of book
 See page 90 para 5 of book
 See page 90 paragraph 5 of book
 See page 91 para 9 of book
 See page 93 para 17 of the book
 See page 95 para 22 of the book
 See page 95 of the book
 See page 96 of the book
 De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for the Time Being and Another  ZACC 35 at para 68
 See paragraph 70 supra
 In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education  ZACC 11
 See para 71 of de Lange supra
 At para 83 De Lange supra
 De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for the time being and Another (726/13  ZASCA 151; 2015 (1) SA 106 (SCA)
 De Lange Supra at para 31
 Ryland v Edros 1997 (2) SA 690 (c) at 703E
  USSC 72; 322 US 78 (1944)
  USSC 178; 426 US 696 (1976)
 R v ST Edmundsbury and Ipswich Diocese (Chancellor); Ex parte White and Another  2 All ER 604 at 605
 2 All ER 249 at 255
 Shergill v Khaira  UKSC 33 para 45
 De Lange Supra
 Para 32 of De Lange supra